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Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards Under Pennsylvania's Public
Employe Relations Act
I.

Introduction

In 1970 Pennsylvania joined the growing trend among the states
in permitting public employees to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives by enacting the Public Employe Relations
Act (PERA).' To "promote orderly and constructive relationships
between all public employers and their employees",2 section 903 of
PERA mandates arbitration of disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements. 3
Generally, in the private sector, arbitrator's awards are binding
on the parties to the dispute, although courts allow appeal under a
limited standard of review.4 In Pennsylvania, appeals from arbitrator's awards issued pursuant to section 903 of PERA are subjected to
what are, at least semantically, varying standards of review. Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the Arbitration Act
of 19275 to arbitral awards under PERA. Because the standard of
review is still evolving, the disposition of appeals appears episodic.
This comment examines the standard of review employed in
light of the development of the law under PERA and the standard of
review employed under Act 111.6 The unique nature of mandatory
1. Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,§§ 1101.101-1101.2201
(Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
Insofar as it applied to public employees, PERA repealed an earlier provision that prohibited public employees from striking. Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1183, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§§ 215.1-215.5 (Purdon 1964).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
3. Id. at § 1101.903.
4. For an overview of judicial review oP'private sector arbitration awards, see St. Antoine, JudicialReview ofLabor ArbitrationAwards: A Second Look at Enterprise *heel and Its
Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV 1137 (1977) [hereinafter cited as St. Antoine]; Comment, Judicial
Deference to Arbitral Determinations. Continuing Problems of Power andFinality, 23 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 936 (1976) [hereinafter cited as JudicialDeference to ArbitralDeterminations].
5. Act of April 25, 1927, P.L. 381, No. 248, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 161-179 (Purdon
1963).
6. Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. 111, § 1 et seq., as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, §§ 217.1-217.10 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Act III provides for interest arbitration between
policemen and firemen and municipalities.
Interest arbitration refers to use of the arbitral process to resolve confficts in the collective
bargaining process. When an impasse in bargaining is reached, the parties may submit the
disputed items to an arbitrator for determination. In effect, an arbitrator or a panel of arbitra-

arbitration and the competing interests of arbitral finality and judicial oversight are also considered.
II.

Taking the Appeal Under PERA
PERA neither provides a statutory standard of review of arbi-

tral determinations, nor prohibits appeals from arbitral awards.'
The threshhold questions, as in any judicial review of an arbitrator's
award, are jurisdiction and arbitrability.
A.

Jurisdiction-Appealto the Commonwealth Court or Court of
Common Pleas

An appeal from an award must be filed in the appropriate court
within thirty days after entry of the award.' This is in the Commonwealth Court if the dispute is between the Commonwealth and an

employee of the Commonwealth,9 or in the appropriate court of
Common Pleas in the case of a public employer other than the Commonwealth.'" These rules apply to both interest arbitration and
grievance arbitration under PERA."
Prior to 1978 the Commonwealth Court allowed collateral attors "makes" a contract for the parties. F.

ELKOURI

& E.A.

ELKOURI,

How

ARBITRATION

47 (3d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ELKOURI & ELKOURI].
In grievance arbitration, an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators interprets a collective bargaining agreement in resolving a dispute arising out of the agreement. Id.
PERA provides for both grievance and interest arbitration. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80), mandates grievance arbitration for disputes arising from
the collective agreement. Interest arbitration is required for collective bargaining impasses
with certain employees who are prohibited from striking. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.805
(Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See note 125 infra.
7. In Gorton v. Commonwealth Civil Serv. Comm'n, 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 319, 329, 385
A.2d 1026, 1031 (1978), the court noted that the binding arbitration under PERA is a "reviewable adjudication." See also Manheim Township School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 627, 276 A.2d 561 (1976).
The mandatory nature of the arbitration militates in favor of judicial review of arbitral
determinations. Mandatory arbitration is justified in the public sector because it assures the
public that labor disputes will not result in strikes and disruption of public services. Board of
Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers Local No. 3, 464 Pa. 92, 346 A.2d 35 (1975). Because
the parties have no choice regarding whether or not to arbitrate, it is reasonable to grant an
appeal on the merits of the award. See notes 126-128 and accompanying text infra.
8. PA. R.A.P. 1512(a)(1) provides for the appeal from arbitration awards in public employment disputes. Under this rule, the date of the arbitrator's decision triggers the thirty day
period. County of Dauphin v. Pennsylvania Social Serv. Union, 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 456, 375
A.2d 1353 (1977), vacatedon other grounds, 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 456, 383 A.2d 999 (1978).
9. PA. R.A.P. 703. This rule superseded PA. R.J.A. 2101, which vested all authority to
hear appeals from public employer disputes in the commonwealth court.
10. PA. R. Cir, P. 247. The explanatory note of the Civil Procedural Rules Committee
states that this rule applies to disputes between local public employees and employers.
11. See note 6 supra. Prior to 1977, two avenues of appeal to the courts existed: one to
the courts of common pleas under the Arbitration Act of 1927, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 173
(Purdon 1963); and the other to the commonwealth court under former PA. R.J.A. 2101. This
discrepancy was settled in Community College of Beaver County v. Community College,
Soc'y of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977), when the court held § 13 of the
Arbitration Act of 1927 pro tanto superseded by PERA. Jurisdiction is governed exclusively
by the rules.
WORKS

tacks on arbitral awards. This alternative to direct appeal was obtained by refusing to comply with the award and waiting for the
opposing party to file an unfair labor practice with the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board (PLRB).' 2 An appeal from the PLRB decision could be taken to a Court of Common Pleas or the Commonwealth Court, depending upon whether the public employer was a
local governmental entity or the Commonwealth. 3 Since an invalid
award of an arbitrator cannot be the basis of an unfair labor practice
for failure to implement an arbitrator's award, the Commonwealth
Court would review the award to determine its validity.' 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court foreclosed this alternative, however, in
PLRB v. Commonwealth.' 5 There the court ruled that, because permitting two avenues of appeal tended to undermine expeidtious enforcement procedures,' 6 one avenue of appeal should exist-that of
direct review in the courts.' 7
Providing for a single route of appeal for the aggrieved party is
sound because it forces the party affected by the adverse ruling to
seek judicial review in the first instance rather than rest on the decision and force the burden of filing an unfair labor practice charge
upon the opposing party.' 8 A procedure allowing the award to be
collaterally attacked is also time-consuming and expensive to both
the parties and the Commonwealth. The only apparent advantage to
collateral attack was the possibility of judicial review after the appeal time had lapsed. The thirty day allowance for appeal, however,
gives sufficient time for the aggrieved party to decide whether to appeal. The procedure for enforcement of the award is also expedited
because the PLRB need only determine whether an award exists,
whether the appeals procedure or time for appeals is exhausted, and
whether the party failed to comply with the award.' 9 If these criteria
are met, the PLRB may then order enforcement of the arbitrator's
award. 20
12. PERA prohibits employers and employee organizations from refusing to comply with
an award of an arbitrator. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 110 1.1201(a)(8), 1101.1201(b)(8) (Purdon
Supp. 1979-80). Thus, either party can enforce an award through an unfair labor practice
charge.
13. PLRB v. Uniontown Area School Dist., 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 61, 367 A.2d 738 (1976).
14. Id.
15. 478 Pa. 582, 387 A.2d 475 (1978).
16. Id. at 590, 387 A.2d at 478.
17. Id.
18. Id. This decision implements the policy that the aggrieved party should be the one to
seek redress in the courts. The opposing party may, of course, still seek enforcement of the
award by the PLRB. Under § 1301 of PERA, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1301 (Purdon
Supp. 1979-80), the PLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the award by way of an unfair
labor practice charge filed under § 1201(a)(8) or § 1201(b)(8) of PERA.
19. PLRB v. Commonwealth, 478 Pa. at 591, 387 A.2d at 479.
20. Id. For application of these principles by the PLRB, see Centennial School Dist., 9
P.P.E.R. 9160 (PLRB 1978); Blairsville-Saltsburg School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 9144 (PLRB
1978).

B. Arbitrability of the Dispute
A refusal to arbitrate a dispute is an unfair labor practice under
PERA unless the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation covering the dispute at issue; that is, unless the dispute is nonarbitrable. t Under PERA, however, judicial inquiry into the
arbitrability of a grievance is limited to whether the parties entered
into an agreement to arbitrate, and whether the dispute is covered by
the agreement.2 2 As a practical matter, the parties must arbitrate all
disputes arising under a collective bargaining agreement. 23 Moreover, when an arbitrator interprets the agreement in favor of the
arbitrability of a grievance, a court "should be slow indeed to disagree. ' 2 4 Consequently, reversal or vacation of the award on the
ground that the arbitrator decided a nonarbitrable dispute is nearly

impossible.
III.
A.

Appeals in the Private Sector: The Essence Test
The Steelworkers Trilogy

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court initially adopted the
federal courts' "essence test" as the standard to be applied to awards
under PERA" This test was announced in the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in the Steelworkers Trilogy,2 6 which clarified the
previously unsettled area of judicial review in the private sector. In
this series of cases, the Supreme Court foreclosed the practice of reviewing the merits of arbitral awards under the pretext of determining arbitrability. 2s The Court took the position that "refusal of
21. Arbitrability is defined as capable of being submitted to arbitration. When a dispute
is taken to arbitration by mutual agreement, there is no question regarding its arbitrability
unless the submission is solely to determine arbitrability. Most labor contracts contain arbitration clauses that limit arbitrability. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 6 at 169. See also
Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, Local No. 3,464 Pa. 92, 99, 346 A.2d 35, 39
(1975); Apollo-Ridge School Dist., 9 P.P.E.R. 9146 (PLRB 1978).
22. Lincoln Univ. v. Lincoln Univ. Faculty Ass'n., 467 Pa. 112, 119, 354 A.2d 576, 580
(1976); North Star School District v. PLRB., 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 429, 433, 386 A.2d 1059, 1062
(1978).
23. Id.
24. County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Indep. Union, 476 Pa.
27, 31-32, 381 A.2d 849, 851 (1978).
25. See notes 48-56 and accompanying text infra.
26. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
27. Judicial intervention came largely under the guise of decisions regarding the arbitrability of the claims under the terms of the agreement. See United Auto Workers v. Benton
Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 814 (1957); ABA
COMMISSION ON ARBITRATION, REPORT ON LABOR ARBITRATION 923 (1957).
Of course, an interpretation of a contract clause relating to arbitration is itself an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig.
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960).
28. The Court decided that not allowing the arbitrator to-decide both the merits and the
procedural issue of arbitrability was a judicial usurpation of the arbitrator's function. United

courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements."2 9 It
stated that
the federal courts should not decide whether the award is
"proper '' 30 because any violation of the agreement between the parties is for the arbitrator, rather than the courts, to decide. 3 ' The standard of review set forth was a general guideline known as the
"essence test".
[Ain arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his
own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long
as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
Such a general standard could result in either an almost unlimited review of awards or permit courts to sustain awards by a conclusory finding that the award is grounded in a construction of the
agreement.33 Nevertheless, the Court did foreclose unlimited review
and open-ended determination of the merits by declaring that plenary review would undermine the finality of the arbitrator's award,
and that the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
was for the arbitrator. 34 As Justice Douglas stated in his directive to
the federal judiciary, "The Courts have no business overruling [an
arbitrator] because their interpretation of the contract is different
from his.''35 The Trilogy cases indicate, moreover, that the arbitrator
may look to "the law" for guidance in the interpretation of the
agreement. 36 Additionally, the arbitrator may consider the impact
on the workplace in interpreting the agreement and making an
award.3 7
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960). See also New Bedford Defense
Products Div. v. Local No. 1113, 258 F.2d 522, 526 (1st Cir. 1958).
29. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). The
Court did not go so far as to endorse utter finality of the award. Thus, when "the arbitrator's
awards manifest an infidelity" to the agreement, the courts "have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award." Id. at 597.
30. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
31. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960).
32. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
Although this test appears to expand the common law standard of review of arbitral awards, it
is limited by later language indicating that awards should not be attacked for error. Id. at 598.
Early precedent exists for the proposition that an arbitrator's award will not be set aside
for error of law or fact. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854).
33. Also, a party could contend that review is necessary in light of contractual clauses
prohibiting an arbitrator from adding to or substracting from the collective bargaining agreement. These are commonly referred to as integration or "zipper" clauses. See JudicialDeference to ArbitralDeterminations,supra note 4, at 955.
34. United Steeworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
35. Id.
36. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
37. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). The
law of the shop rationale is less persuasive in the context of public sector arbitration. See notes
122-123 and accompanying text infra.

B. Refinement of the Test-Ludwig-Honold
Although the position of the Supreme Court appeared to foreclose broad judicial review of labor arbitration awards, lower federal
courts varied in their interpretation of the new ruling. The interpretations and applications of the essence test ran from38 a total proscription of judicial review to almost wholesale review.
Some clarification of the essence test came in a decision of the
Third Circuit, Ludwig-HonoldMfg. Co. v. Fletcher,39 in which Judge
Aldisert stated that
a labor arbitrator's award does "draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement" if the interpretation can in any rational way be denved from the agreement, viewed in the light of
its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention; only where there is a manifest disregard of the agreement,
totally unsupported by principles of contract construction and the
law of the shop, may a reviewing court disturb the award.'
The court ruled that reversal of an arbitrator was not proper
unless the arbitral award "flies in the face of any rational interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement . . . ."It Thus, the essence test came to mandate noninterference by the courts unless
evidence of irrational behavior or a total disregard of the contract
alexists. Later cases in the federal sector follow this rationale,
42
though the scope of review still remains somewhat flexible.
Enterprise Wheel and Ludwig-Honold elevated arbitral determinations to an exalted status. Nevertheless, Enterprise Wheel confined
the arbitrator's zone of action to "the four corners of the collective
bargaining agreement. 4 3 Deference to the arbitrator's judgment in
38. See, e.g., Dallas Typographical Union, No. 173 v. A.H. Belo Corp., 372 F.2d 577 (5th
Cir. 1967) (award may not be overturned even if the court believes proper legal principles were
not followed); Local 7-644, Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l. Union v. Mobil Oil Co., 350
F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1965) (award will stand as long as it is not arbitrary); Textile Workers Union
v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961) (review is proper if the arbitrator went
beyond the "scope of the submission").
Other cases held that there was to be no review at all. See, e.g., International Bhd. of
Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers Local 874 v. St. Regis Paper Co., 362 F.2d 711 (5th Cir.
1966); American Mach. & Foundry Co. v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implements Workers, 256 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 329 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1964).
39. 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969).
40. Id. at 1128. The court noted that the rationale underlying a narrow standard of review for commercial arbitration awards applies even more strongly to labor arbitration. Id.
See also Beinhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
41. 405 F.2d at 1133.
42. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n., 530 F.2d 1048 (D.C. Cir.
1976). The court held that review was proper if the arbitrator relied on a stipulation between
the parties that did not exist. Such a flexible standard may in fact be necessary in light of
situations in which the arbitrator has relied upon a nonexistent contract term.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has followed similar rationale with respect to awards
under PERA. County of Alleghany v. Alleghany County Prison Employees Indep. Union, 476
Pa. 27, 381 A.2d 849 (1977).
43. Ludwig-Honold Mfg. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1969).

the absence of his misconduct or failing to at least utilize the agreement in arriving at an award became the rule rather than the exception in the private sector.
Now the question is whether this standard of review should be
44
applicable to mandatory public sector labor arbitration awards.
Under typical statutes, binding arbitration is the final step in the dispute-resolution process. 45 Thus, both must arbitrate by statutory
mandate.' This restriction on the parties' choice of a tribunal requires some judicial oversight, and arguably, justifies a broader standard of review than is afforded when arbitration is the mechanism
chosen by the parties to resolve their differences. Accordingly,
whether this narrow standard of review and the protection it affords
to the arbitrator's determinations is necessary or justifiable for public
sector labor arbitration awards remains questionable.
IV. The Standard of Review Under PERA
Section 903 of the PERA provides, in pertinent part, that the
"[a]rbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is
mandatory.

' 47

Although sections 1501 and 1502 of PERA provide

standards for judicial review of PLRB orders, 48 no comparable provision exists for mandatory arbitration awards.49 The standard of
44. Mandatory or compulsory arbitration is a process of dispute settlement that is required by law. The parties must accept arbitration as the conflict-resolving mechanism.
ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 6 at 17 See generabl Farmer, Compulsory Arbitration-A
Management Lawyer's View, 51 VA. L. REV. 399 (1965); Feller, Compulsory Arbitration-A
Union Lawyer's View, 51 VA.L. REV. 410 (1965). But cf.Schwartz, Zs Compulsory Arbitration
Necessary?, 15 ARB. J. 189 (1960) (compulsory arbitration eliminates free collective bargaining
and politicizes labor disputes).
45. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 979-M (3) (1974); New York's Taylor Law,
N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80); Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No.
11, § 4(a); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.4(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). See generally
Standohor, The Grievance Arbitration and No-Strike Model in PublicEmployment, 31 ARB. J.
116 (1976).
46. The compulsory nature must be weighed against the possibility of a strike by the
public employees and the attendant disruption of public services. Compare HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW (1966); with Jones & Smith, Management andLaborAppraisals and Criticisms ofthe ArbitrationProcess. A Report With Comments, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1115
(1964); Sullivan, How Can the Problem ofthe Public Employees Strike be Resolved?, 19 OKLA.
L. REV. 365 (1966).
An attack can be made against compulsory arbitration on the ground that it unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to private parties. Pennsylvania has a constitutional
amendment authorizing interest arbitration. PA. CONST. Art. 3 § 31. See also Harney v.
Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969).
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1501, 1101.1502 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80), provide that
in review of orders of the board, findings of fact will be sustained if supported by substantial
and legally credible evidence. Section 1502 has been re-codified as part of the Pennsylvania
Judicial Code. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 933(a)(1)(vii) (1979).
49. Some state public labor relations acts do contain standards for judicial review of
arbitral awards. See, e.g, ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-474(j)(3)
(1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 979-M(3) (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.242 (Supp.
1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.450 (1974).

review applicable to arbitrator's awards under PERA, despite a significant number of cases addressing the issue, is not at all clear.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pronouncements on the

issue are inconsistent and capable of varying interpretations.
A.

°

Adopting a Standardof Review
1.

Adoption of the Essence Test by the Commonwealth Court-

Prior to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the review of PERA arbitral awards, the commonwealth court
faced a dilemma: arbitrator's awards issued pursuant to PERA were
reviewable, but no statutory or judicially defined standard for this
review existed.5" In Teamsters Local Union No. 77 v. Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission52 the commonwealth court adopted the es-

sence test, as refined by Ludwig-Honold, as the applicable standard
of review. Refusing to review the merits of the case, the court stated
there was no "manifest disregard" of the collective bargaining agreement and upheld the award. 3
The court's rationale for selecting the essence test is not apparent, and no explanation for its wholesale adoption was given in later
cases.54 By not questioning the applicability of the essence test, the
court overlooked two other standards of review of arbitral determinations available in Pennsylvania, common law standards5 5 and the
Arbitration Act of 1927.56
2. Adoption ofthe ArbitrationAct-In two decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court endorsed the commonwealth court's adoption of the essence test, but modified it by applying it through the
Arbitration Act of 1927.
50. See notes 97-110 and accompanying text infra.
5 1. In Community College of Beaver County v. Community College, Soc. of the Faculty
17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 231, 331 A.2d 921 (1975), rev'd, 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977), the
commonwealth court delved into the merits of the decision without any determination of the
proper standard of review. This decision was reversed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
See notes 61-70 and accompanying text infra.
52. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 238, 331 A.2d 588 (1975).
53. Id. at 242, 331 A.2d at 590.
54. See Northern Tioga School Dist. v. Northern Tioga School Serv. Personnel Ass'n, 29
Pa. Commw. Ct. 576, 365 A.2d 167 (1976); Franklin County v. AFSCME, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct.
379, 346 A.2d 845 (1975); County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Indep.
Union, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 173, 341 A.2d 578 (1975).
55. Common law standards have been applied to judicial review of labor arbitration
awards in Pennsylvania. See Harwitz v. Adams, 406 Pa. 539, 178 A.2d 617 (1962). These
standards are very narrow, permitting the award to be attacked only upon clear and convincing evidence of a denial of a hearing, or fraud, misconduct, corruption or other irregularity
resulting in an unjust or unconscionable award. See Sudders v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 217 Pa.
Super. Ct. 196, 264 A.2d 370, afrd, 445 Pa. 599, 284 A.2d 500 (1971). The award is not reviewable for error of law or fact. Freeman v. Ajax Foundry Prods., Inc., 398 Pa. 457, 159 A.2d 708
(1960).
56. Act of April 25, 1927, P.L. 381, No. 248, §§ 10, 11, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 170 and
171 (Purdon 1963).

In the first of these cases, InternationalBrotherhoodof Firemen
5 7 the Penn& Oilers Local 1201 v. School District of Philadephia,
sylvania Supreme Court discussed the Arbitration Act, and noted
several inconsistencies between it and PERA.5 8 Nevertheless, it declined to rule on the applicability of the act to PERA awards. Instead, the court determined that the arbitrator's award would be
upheld regardless of the standard used, because the award made a
reasonable construction of the labor agreement.5 9 The court did not

find that PERA superseded the Arbitration Act. Rather, by refusing
to adopt a definite standard, it left the issue regarding the scope of
judicial inquiry unanswered.6 °
This issue again came before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Community College of Beaver County v. Community College, Society of the Faculty.6' The court held the Arbitration Act applicable
insofar as it is consistent with PERA, 62 noting that sections 10 and 11
of the Arbitration Act,63 with one exception, were adoptions of the
57. 465 Pa. 356, 350 A.2d 804 (1976).
58. For example, Section 903 allows the parties to specify the procedure to be followed in arbitration. The Act of 1927, however, sets forth the procedure to be followed, and provides further that the court of common pleas may adopt rules of
procedure and practice to be followed to the extent that the rules adopted are not
inconsistent with the Act of 1927. Although both Section 903 of PERA and Section 4
of the Act of 1927 provide that the parties to an arbitration agreement may choose
the method of appointment of arbitrators, the two acts differ with respect to the selection of arbitrators in the absence of agreement by the parties.
Id. at 366 n.9, 350 A.2d at 809 n.9.
59. Id. at 366, 350 A.2d at 809. The court noted that it was "quite reasonable" for the
arbitrator to decide that the intent of the parties was as stated in the award. Id. This standard
of reasonableness appears consistent with the essence test of the federal courts as used by the
commonwealth court.
60. Id. In a series of cases following the decision in InternationalBhd of Firemen &
Oilers, the commonwealth court retained the essence test as the proper standard under PERA.
See Lewisburg Area Educ. Ass'n v. Lewisburg Area Bd. of School Directors, 29 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 488, 371 A.2d 568 (1977); United Transp. Union, Local 1594 v. Southeastern Pa. Transp.
Auth., Red Arrow Div., 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 323, 368 A.2d 834 (1977); Portage Area School
Dist. v. Portage Area Educ. Ass'n, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 244, 368 A.2d 864 (1977); Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Social Serv. Union, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 128, 365 A.2d 666 (1976);
Northampton Area Bd. of Educ. v. Zehner, 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 401, 360 A.2d 793 (1976);
South Allegheny School Dist. v. South Allegheny Educ. Ass'n, 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 282, 360
A.2d 829 (1976); AFSCME v. Commonwealth, 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 162, 354 A.2d 1 (1976);
School Dist. of the City of Allentown v. Allentown Educ. Ass'n, 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 224, 351
A.2d 292 (1976).
61. 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977).
62. Id. at 595-96, 375 A.2d at 1276.
63. Section 10 provides that an award may be vacated
(a) Where the award was produced by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators,
or any of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy, or any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them
that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 170 (Purdon 1963). An award may be modified or corrected
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures, or an evident

Model State Arbitration Act.' This exception is subsection 11(d),
which allows judicial modification or correction of an arbitrators
award when the award is "against the law, and is such that had it

been the verdict of the jury the court would have entered different or

other judgment notwithstanding the verdict." 65
The court reasoned that PERA did not impliedly repeal the Arbitration Act because section 16 of the Arbitration Act 66 states that

its provisions apply to contracts to which the Commonwealth is a
party.67 After acknowledging the areas of conflict between the acts
noted earlier in InternationalBortherhoodof Firemen & Oilers,68 the
court emphasized that these points of conflict do not indicate that the

Arbitration Act should be inapplicable to awards under PERA.6 9 In
effect, the court concluded that the statutes must be read in pari
70
materia.
It is questionable, however, whether the Pennsylvania Legislature intended the Arbitration Act to supplement PERA. Although
the Arbitration Act provides certain arbitral procedures not included
in PERA,7 ' other considerations militate against reading the two acts
as one comprehensive statute.
First, a forty-three year span exists between the enactments,
suggesting that the legislature intended to create a new and comprehensive plan concerning public employers and employees.7 2 Second,
PERA makes no reference whatsoever to the earlier act as governing

judicial review or any of its provisions. Certainly, an ommission of
material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the
award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
(d) Where the award is against the law, and is such that had it been a verdict of the
jury the court would have entered different or other judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.

Id. § 171.
64. 2 J. AM. JUD. SoC'v 122 (1926). The court noted that the Model Act merely restates
the common law grounds for vacating or modifying an arbitrator's award. 473 Pa. at 588, 375
A.2d at 1273.
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17 1(d) (Purdon 1963).
66. Id. at § 176.
67. 473 Pa. at 595, 375 A.2d at 1276.
68. See note 58 supra.
69. 473 Pa. at 595, 375 A.2d at 1276.
70. Id. The Arbitration Act specifically excludes contracts for personal services. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 161 (Purdon 1963). The courts have determined, however, that collective
bargaining agreements are not contracts for personal services within the meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Povey v. Midvale Co., 175 Pa. Super. Ct. 395, 105 A.2d 172 (1954).
71. The Arbitration Act provides for the following: (1) Stay of other proceedings pending arbitration, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 162 (Purdon 1963); (2) A system of compelling arbitration or determining arbitrability, Id. § 163; (3) Replacement of disqualified, deceased or
departing arbitrators, Id. § 164; (4) Subpoena and payment of witnesses, Id. § 166; and (5)
Taking depositions. Id. § 167.
72. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80), stating the public
policy of the Commonwealth and the purpose of the act.

such a material provision cannot be viewed as inadvertant. Third,
sections 1933 and 1936 of the Statutory Construction Act of 197213
provide that when a later statute conflicts with the provisions of an
earlier act, the legislature intends the most recent enactment to control. Under this rule, review of PERA awards is arguably not governed by the Arbitration Act because section 903 of the PERA
overrules it in such applications.74
Moreover, with the differing provisions of the two enactments,
dual coverage becomes confusing. Under such a dual application,
PERA would control with respect to appointment of arbitrators and
the procedure to be followed in arbitration 75 while the Arbitration
Act of 1927 would govern judicial review.7 6 This is precisely what
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court promotes in Beaver County by ruling that the two statutes are not irreconcilable and that when inconsistencies exist, PERA controls.7 7
When analyzing the court's rationale for the adoption of the Arbitration Act, it is instructive to look to the application of the Act in
commercial and private sector labor arbitration for which it was
originally intended. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously
refused to apply the Arbitration Act's standards unless the contract
incorporated the terms of the Act and did not make the arbitrator's
award final and binding.7 8 Nevertheless, the court abandoned these
principles and held the Arbitration Act applicable to review of all
arbitral awards under PERA, whether or not the collective agreement incorporates its terms.7 9
B. Harmonizingthe ArbitrationAct and the Essence Test
Beaver County and subsequent cases separate section 11(d) of
the Arbitration Act into two standards: the judgment n.o.v. standard
and the illegality standard. To some degree, the two overlap. Both,
73. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1933, 1936 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
74. Id.
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, 0. 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 170 and 171 (Purdon 1963).
77. 473 Pa. at 595, 375 A.2d at 1276. See also IPA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1971(c) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
78. Wingate Constr. Co. v. Schweizer Dipple, Inc., 419 Pa. 74, 77, 213 A.2d 275, 277
(1965).
The requirement that the award be final and binding does not remove it from coverage of
the Arbitration Act if the Commonwealth is a party. See Acchione v. Commonwealth, 347 Pa.
562, 32 A.2d 764 (1943); Seaboard Surety Co. v. Commonwealth, 345 Pa. 147, 27 A.2d 27
(1942).
79, Community College of Beaver County v. Community College, Soc'y of the Faculty,
473 Pa. 576, 595, 375 A.2d 1267, 1276. It is interesting to note that the court was not hesitant to
find that the Arbitration Act provisions dealing with the proper court in which to appeal was
pro tanto superseded by PERA and PA. R.J.A. 2101. See notes 8-11 and accompanying text
.spra.

somewhat cryptically, have been analogized to the federal court's es-

sence test, which results in some confusion.
. The Judgment n. o. v. Standard-Withrespect to the Arbitration Act's judgment notwithstanding the verdict provision, the Beaver County court stated,
While introduction of the 'n.o.v.' concept into the field of arbitration may have been a new departure it is hardly a radical change,
nor does it dictate that a much closer or different scrutiny of an
available than under the approach of
arbitration award will be 80
Enterprise W"eel and Car.
The court reasoned that when an arbitrator determines the intent of

the parties in the agreement, he resolves a question of fact. 8 Therefore, the award should not be set aside by a reviewing court if "the
can in any rational way be derived from the agreeinterpretation
'8 2
ment.
In light of the traditional standards for entry of judgment
n.o.v.,8 3 the court's interpretation of the Arbitration Act appears to
be a restatement of the essence test. Both standards are narrow and
founded on the basis that a finding will not be overturned if it is
supported by evidence (judgment n.o.v.) or derived from the agreement (essence test). Nevertheless, the two standards are different.
Judgment n.o.v. applies to findings of juries that are not based on
facts.8" The essence test turns on the abuse of discretion by the arbi-

trator,85 and is more closely related to a standard for reversing a
judge's findings. 86 There is no verdict in a trial without a jury;
neither is one present in arbitration. It is difficult to see the rationale
for harmonzing the two standards when there is so little need for
such a standard given the nature of the arbitral forum.
80. 473 Pa. at 489-90, 375 A.2d at 1273.
81. Id. at 594, 375 A.2d at 1275. The distinction between findings of law or fact arose in
two Pennsylvania Superior Court opinions dealing with the Arbitration Act. The court held
that because the interpretation of an ambiguous written agreement is a question of fact, an
arbitrator's award is reviewable only to the extent of a jury's finding of fact. Pein v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 283, 361 A.2d 348 (1976); Framlau v. Upper
Dauphin School Auth. Bd., 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 369, 281 A.2d 464 (1971).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this approach in Beaver County, reasoning that
such an interpretation would make the standard of review contingent upon whether the agreement was interpreted as ambiguous or unambiguous. 473 Pa. at 592-593, 375 A.2d at 1274-75.
82. 473 Pa. at 593-94, 375 A.2d at 1275.
83. In jury trials, judgment n.o.v. will be entered only if reasonable minds cannot differ
regarding the validity of the moving party's position after viewing all the evidence in the light
most favorable the the verdict winner. Findings of fact will not be reviewed if they are supported by evidence. Miller v. Checker Yellow Cab Co., 465 Pa. 82, 348 A.2d 128 (1975);
Musser v. Shenk, 192 Pa. Super. Ct. 471, 161 A.2d 628 (1960).
84. See 9 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2521,
2537-2538 (1971); 5A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 50.03 (1977).
85. United Transp. Union, Local 1594 v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., Red Arrow
Div., 28 Pa. Comrnw. Ct. 323, 329, 368 A.2d 834, 837 (1977).
86. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 16 (3d ed. 1940).

2 The Illegality Standard-Beaver County referred to the
power to set aside illegal arbitration awards under section 11(d) of
the Arbitration Act as "salutary and quite consistent both with the
PERA and with the approach to resolution of labor disputes exemplified in the federal scheme of things by Enterprise Wheel and Car
... "87 Apparently, the court determined that if the interpretation
can be reasonably derived from the agreement, it is not against the
law under section 1l(d) of the Arbitration Act.8 8 This construction
of the act follows both the essence test and the common law rule that
awards will not be set aside for error of law or fact. 89
This analogy between the essence test and the illegality standard
is asserted without much support, especially in light of section 703 of
PERA, 9° which prohibits implementation of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that would be in violation of a statute.
Strictly following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's "reasonably derived" interpretation of the illegality standard would require judicial
deference to an arbitral award that implements an illegal provision
of a collective agreement. The commonwealth court, however, interpreted section 703 of PERA as authorization to set aside arbitration
awards that conflict with statutes, 9' recognizing that extending the
"reasonableness" rule92 to an arbitrator's interpretation of law could
lead to anomalies.
Thus, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the underlying rationale for the Arbitration Act and the essence test to be
similar, any analogy between the two, while superficially appealing,
is nonetheless flawed. The essence test is a narrow standard of review and parallels common law rules for vacating an arbitrator's
award9 3 The Arbitration Act, on the other hand, as interpreted by
the Pennsylvania courts, is the foundation for a broader scope of
review. Under section 11(d), an illegal award may be set aside;
under the essence test, if the award is grounded in the agreement, it
must stand.94 By restricting the application of section 11(d) to the
essence test, the court implicitly contradicts precedent that the arbitrator's mistake of law is reviewable under the section. 95 No ration87. 473 Pa. at 594, 375 A.2d at 1275.
88. Id. at 597-98, 375 A.2d at 1277.
89. See note 55 supra.
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
91. Dauphin County Tech. School Educ. Ass'n v. Dauphin County Area Voc. Tech.
School Bd., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 639, 357 A.2d 721 (1976), aff'dby an equaly divided court,483
Pa. 604, 398 A.2d 168 (1978).
92. See notes 138-143 and accompanying text infra.
93. International Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers Local 1201 v. School Dist. of Phila., 465 Pa.
356, 354, 350 A.2d 804, 808 (1976).
94. See Part III supra.
95. Early precedent exists in commercial arbitration under § II(d) that the award may be
reviewed for error or mistake of law by the arbitrator. Pennsylvania Elec. Co. v. Shannon, 377
Pa. 352, 105 A.2d 55 (1954); McDevitt v. McDevitt, 365 Pa. 18, 93 A.2d 394 (1950); Penn-

ale is given for applying a more restrictive interpretation of the act to
PERA arbitral awards. Indeed, it appears more reasonable to grant
a broader appeal on the merits under the mandatory arbitration provisions of PERA than in the commercial setting or private sector labor arbitration in which arbitration is voluntary.96
C. Application of the ArbitrationAct
1.

Inconsistent Application by the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court-The deficiencies in holding that the Arbitration Act standards and the essence test are essentially similar became more apparent in later applications of Beaver County, which are neither clear
nor consistent. In Leechburg Area School District v. Leechburg Edu-

cation Association,97 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disregarded
the ruling of Beaver County and strictly applied the provisions of
section 10 of the Arbitration Act instead of the essence test as interpreted through section 1 (d). The court reasoned that since the appealing party sought to vacate the award rather than modify or
correct it, section 10 provided the appropriate test. 8 The decision
failed to mention the essence test or apply its principles to the arbitral award.99 Instead, the court held the appellant's assertion that the
arbitrator misinterpreted the agreement was not cognizable under
section 10 of the Arbitration Act because the court lacked j urisdiction to determine this question."° Yet this is precisely the question
the court decided in Beaver County by interpreting the Arbitration
Act as setting forth essentially the same criteria as the essence test.' 0 '
sylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Smith, 350 Pa. 355, 39 A.2d 139 (1944). See also Pein v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 283, 361 A.2d 348 (1974). But cf. Goldstein v.
ILGWU, 328 Pa. 385, 196 A. 43 (1938) (arbitrator is the final judge of law and fact and his
award will not be reviewed for mistake.)
96. See notes 126-28 and accompanying text infra.
97. 475 Pa. 413, 380 A.2d 1203 (1977).
98. Id. at 417, 380 A.2d at 1204. It should be noted that in Beaver County, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court spoke of modifying, correcting or vacating the award under § I I(d) of
the Arbitration Act. Community College of Beaver County v. Community College, Soc'y of
the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 598, 375 A.2d 1267, 1277 (1977). The court gave no reason for the
departure from its earlier rationale.
The commonwealth court applied § 1 (d) of the Arbitration Act to vacate an arbitrator's
award under PERA. The court reasoned that if the only way to correct the award under
§ 11 (d) is to set it aside, vacation is the proper remedy. Scholastic Tech. Serv. Employees, The
Pennsylvania State University, Local Union No. 8 v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 37 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 622, 626, 391 A.2d 1097, 1099 (1978).
99. See 475 Pa. at 425, 380 A.2d at 1208-09 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
100. 475 Pa. at 418, 380 A.2d at 1205.
101. Justice Pomeroy, in a concurring opinion, pointed out the inconsistency between the
majority opinion and the Beaver County rationale. He stated that Beaver County requires that
the arbitrator's award not be set aside under § 11(d) so long as it meets the essence test. Claiming the majority overlooked both Beaver County and the essence test in finding the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, he stated, "Jurisdiction we surely have; the only question is
how it should be exercised." 475 Pa. at 426, 380 A.2d at 1209 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
Similarly, Justice Roberts in his concurrence stated that the Arbitration Act of 1927 is not
controlling, apparently reading Beaver County as merely the vehicle by which the federal essence test was adopted. Id. at 421-22, 380 A.2d at 1206-07 (Roberts, J., concurring).

In County ofAllegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union, 0 2 the court, after citing both Beaver County 0 3 and
the essence test,1°4 proceeded to set aside the award because it was
based on past practices that were not a part of the agreement.t°5 In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the essence test as the
proper application of Beaver County, °" contrary to the holding in
Leechburg. Justice Pomeroy's opinion mentioned the Arbitration
Act only in a passing reference.' 0 7 The dissenting opinions likewise
relied exclusively on the essence test as the proper standard. 0 8
Thus, in the two cases immediately following Beaver County,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ignored its earlier ruling. Leechburg seems to predicate the question of the appropriate standard on
whether a party seeks vacation or modification of the award. 09 Allegheny County, on the other hand, applies the essence test without
consideration of the remedy sought." t0 Both decisions depart from
the earlier rationale in Beaver County, and merely confound uniform
review of public sector arbitral awards.
An alternative rationale exists to reconcile Beaver County with
the two later decisions, that of a two-tiered analysis. First, the court
must determine whether the arbitrator's award is based on the collective bargaining agreement. If the award does not draw its "essence" from the agreement, then it must be set aside." I If, however,
the award satisfies the essence test, the inquiry must proceed under
sections 10 and I1 of the Arbitration Act, depending on whether va102. 476 Pa. 27, 381 A.2d 849 (1977).
103. Id. at 38, 381 A.2d at 854-55.
104. Id.
105. The collective bargaining agreement in question contained a broad integration clause
prohibiting the arbitrator from altering the agreement. See note 33 supra. The court held that
in the presence of such a clause, past practices which preceded the date of the contract cannot
be said to draw its essence from the agreement. Id. See generally Feller, A General Theory of
the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 718-71 (1973).
106. 476 Pa. at 38, 381 A.2d at 854-55. The court overturned the award.
For the arbitrator to seek to supply the remedy is on these facts not in accord with the
approach of Enterprise. . . . which we have adopted as the proper one for applying
the Arbitration Act in public employment contracts. The award must be set aside.
Id.
107. Id. at 39, 381 A.2d at 855.
108. Justice Roberts dissented on the grounds that the court misapplied the essence test
and ignored its teaching by not respecting arbitrators as "the final judges of both law and fact."
Id. at 43, 381 A.2d at 857 (Roberts, J., -dissenting).
Justice Manderino dissented on similar grounds, adding that the parties bargained for an
arbitral determination and are bound by the award. Id. at 46-47, 381 A.2d at 859 (Manderino,
J., dissenting). In light of PERA's statutorily mandated arbitration, Justice Manderino's statement is inapplicable. See notes 126-28 and accompanying text infra.
109. See Justice Pomeroy's concurring opinion, Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Leechburg Educ. Ass'n, 475 Pa. 413, 424-25, 380 A.2d 1203, 1208-09 (1977) (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
110. County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Indep. Union, 476 Pa.
27, 38-39, 381 A.2d 849, 854-55 (1977).
111. County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Indep. Union, 476 Pa.
27, 381 A.2d 849 (1977).

cation or modification of the award is sought."I2 The only problem
with this mode of analysis is that it is not made clear by the opinions
in Leechburg and Allegheny County, or in subsequent decisions of
the court." 3 Nevertheless, this two-step method of inquiry could
provide a clearer standard than that previously articulated in Beaver

County, and, moreover, could eliminate the uncertainty involved in
the court's current interpretation of the Arbitration Act. I 4
2. The Commonwealth Court Interpretation. Reasonableness-

The task of transforming these inconsistent decisions into a workable
standard of review fell on the commonwealth court. Apparently, the
court is attempting to articulate a consistent standard of review,
couched in terms of the "reasonableness" of the arbitral award, with
a deferential if not ambiguous citation to Beaver County.
In Commonwealth v. JointBargaining Committee of Pennsylvania
Employment Security Employees Association,"5 the commonwealth
court reconciled the conflicting tests established by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court by interpreting the Arbitration Act and the essence
test as establishing a test of reasonableness. "If the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement is reasonable, it must be affirmed even if
a contrary interpretation appears more reasonable to the reviewing
court."" 16

This test was further explained in CarmichaelsArea School District v. Carmichaels Area Education Association." 7 The commonwealth court stated that the foundation for reasonableness is whether
or not the arbitrator based his interpretation on the collective bargaining agreement." 8 If the award is rationally derived from the
agreement, then the award must be upheld.' 19
112. Leechburg Area School Dist. v. Leechburg Educ. Ass'n, 475 Pa. 413, 380 A.2d 1203
(1977).
113. See notes 115-120 and accompanying text infra. This rationale did, however, receive
some support in Dauphin County Tech. School Educ. Ass'n v. Dauphin County Area Voc.
Tech. School Board, 483 Pa. 604, 398 A.2d 168, (1978), a 'g by an equally divided court, 24 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 639, 357 A.2d 721 (1976). In the opinion for the reversal of the commonwealth
court decision, Justice Roberts stated,
Because the majority rests its decision on a misapplication of the essence test, it
avoids resolving the asserted conflict between [the two statutes]. Because the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the agreement, the Court should reach this question
of statutory interpretation.
Id. at 613, 398 A.2d at 172. While the opinion apparently suggests a multiple analysis, it does
not further explain the methodology.
114. See notes 97-101 and accompanying text supra.
115. 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 347, 386 A.2d 1050 (1978). The arbitrator ruled that the grievant's guilty plea to a summary offense did not preclude his reinstatement under an amnesty
agreement excluding employees who committed crimes or misdemeanors during a strike.
While the commonwealth court relied on a test of the "reasonableness" of the award, an alternative rationale for review is the arbitrator's interpretation of law external to the contract. See
notes 145-154 and accompanying text infra.
116. Id. at 351, 386 A.2d at 1052.
117. 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 141, 289 A.2d 1203 (1978).
118. Id. at 147, 389 A.2d at 1206.
119. Id. at 144, 389 A.2d at 1205.

In sum, the commonwealth court is merely applying the essence
test under another name. It is not straining the essence test to equate
a basis in the collective bargaining agreement with a reasonable construction of the labor agreement. Indeed, the "reasonableness" of
the award is implicit in an application of the essence test.' 20 Hence,
the two tests are identical. The commonwealth court's attempts to
reconcile the apparently inconsistent pronouncements of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court results only in a return to the pre-Beaver
County decisions applying the essence test and giving deference to
the arbitrator in the absence of evidence showing a manifest disregard of the agreement.
D.

Should the Essence Test be Applied to Public Sector Awards?

In light of the differences between public and private sector arbitration,1 2 ' a private sector arbitration standard should not be
blindly adopted as the proper scope of review for arbitral awards
under PERA. The fundamental assumption underlying the essence
test, such as the expertise of arbitrators in construing collective bargaining agreements and the arbitrator's familiarity with the "law of
the shop,"'' 2 are not applicable to the public sector. To the extent
that there is a "law of the shop" in the public sector, it is doubtful
that arbitrators are any more expert at its application than the courts.
Indeed, the "law of the shop" in the public sector is apparently nothing more than principles of fair play and substantial justice, with
which courts are surely as familiar as arbitrators. This is especially
so when the issue before the arbitrator is the presence of "just cause"
23
for discipline.
Moreover, arbitration plays a much less significant role in providing an alternative to strikes in the context of public sector labor
relations. Grievance arbitration is not the quidpro quo for a nostrike clause like it is in private sector agreements. 2 4 The limited
rights of public employees to strike is not affected by the presence or
120. See Ludwig-Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1132 (3d Cir. 1969).
121. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated,
Although [the federal decisions] may provide some guidance, we are mindful of the
distinction that necessarily must exist between legislation primarily directed to the
private sector and that for public employees. The distinction between public and
private sector cannot be minimized ....
PLRB v. State College School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 499, 377 A.2d 262, 264 (1975).
122. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
123. "Just cause" is similar to the concepts of substantive and procedural due process in

the courts. In the absence of a provision in the collective bargaining agreement, just cause
usually is implied in terms of fairness, notice, arbitrary or capricious action, tradition, and the
relationship between the discipline and the offense. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 6, at
610-14; Griffen, JudicialReviewofLaborArbitrationAwards, 4 SUFF. L. REV.39, 47-55 (1969);
Comment, Substantive Due Process: The Extent of PublicEmployee's Protection from Arbitrary
Dismissal, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1647 (1977).
124. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).

absence of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agree25
ment.1
The United States Supreme Court reasoned that because arbitral awards are bargained for by the parties, a narrow standard of
review is justified.' 2 6 Notwithstanding any value this rationale has
in the private sector, 27 it is meaningless in the light of PERA's arbitration provisions since the arbitrator's determination is not bar128
gained for, but rather, is required by statutory mandate.
Futhermore, the "floodgate" justification for a narrow standard such
as the essence test is weakened in the context of public sector labor
relations law. The public interest is directly implicated as a result of
the wide-reaching effects of an arbitrator's decision in a public sector
arbitration. These considerations require that an arbitral award be
subjected to closer review then the essence test affords.
E

Broadening the Essence Test: Erroneous Interpretation of Law

The commonwealth court, in several decisions, approached the
issue of whether an arbitrator's mistake of law results in an illegal
award within the meaning of the Arbitration Act. These decisions
29
evince a significant development of the Beaver County decision
because an arbitral award may be characterized "illegal" for either
of two reasons. One is when the award requires a party to perform
an illegal act. The other is when the award itself is not illegal, but is
based on an erroneous interpretation of law by the arbitrator.
1. Affirmative Illegal Act-The narrow view of an illegal
award, that which requires an affirmative illegal act, is the standard
of review applied to interest arbitration awards under the Policemen
and Firemen Bargaining Act [Act 111].30 Therefore, it is instructive
to examine this scope of review as a basis for evaluating the review
of arbitration awards under PERA.
Act 111 provides for binding interest arbitration in the event of
125. Article X of PERA provides that personnel at prisons and mental institutions and
employees of the courts are prohibited from striking at any time. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43
§ 1101.1001 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80). Moreover, all public employees are prohibited from
striking during the time that a collective bargaining agreement is m effect. Id. § 1101.1002
Public employees are not prohibited from striking, however, when collective bargaining
processes in PERA have been exhausted, unless the strike creates a danger or threat to the
public health, safety or welfare. Id. § 1101.1003.
126. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599
(1960).
127. This rationale for a narrow standard of review is soundly criticized in Feller, Arbitralion: The Days ofIts Glory Are Numbered, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 97 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Feller].
128. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
129. See notes 86-96 and accompanying text supra.
130. Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. I 11, § I et. seq., as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, §§ 217.1-217.10 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).

a bargaining impasse, but specifically prohibits any appeal from the
award.' 3 ' Such a restriction could result in the arbitrator forming a
binding contract between the parties that requires one to perform an
illegal act. To obviate this anomaly, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in The Washington Arbitration Case, 3 2 held that despite the

statutory proscription, an appeal may be brought to determine
whether there was an "excess in the exercise of powers" by the arbitrator.133 Such an excess occurs when the arbitrator's award requires
the employer to "perform any duty or take some action which is impliedly or34 specifically prohibited by the statutory law governing its
affairs." 1

This narrow standard is justified in the context of interest arbitration. The arbitrator acts in a quasi-legislative capacity to create
an agreement for the parties and he does so on a more informed
basis than a reviewing court.135 Moreover, the language of Act Ill
provides direct statutory support for the narrowest standard of review possible-when an act contrary to law is required by the arbitral award. 136 Clearly, under Act 11, the arbitrator is not deemed
an expert at interpreting the law external to the agreement. If his
interpretation results in an award requiring an illegal act, it 37is reviewable for errors in the construction of applicable statutes.
In the context of PERA grievance arbitration, the commonwealth court draws a parallel from review of illegal awards under
Act 111 to the provisions of section 703 of PERA. 38 In Dauphin
County Technical School Education Association v. Dauphin County
Area Vocational Technical School Board,'3 9 the arbitrator based the

award on a provision of the agreement that conflicted with a statute. 40 The court ruled that the award implemented an illegal provision of the agreement under section 703 and reversed for "error of
131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.7(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
132. 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437 (1969).
133. Id. at 175, 259 A.2d 441. The court's rationale is supported by the provisions of§ 31
of Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides that findings of panels "acting
in accordance with law" are binding on the employers. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 31.
134. Allegheny County Firefighters, Local 1038, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Allegheny
County, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 81, 86, 299 A.2d 60, 62 (1973). See also Conley v. Joyce, 27 Pa.
Comnmw. Ct. 468, 366 A.2d 1292 (1976); Skiles v. City of Lancaster, 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 580,
358 A.2d 131 (1976); Montgomery Twp. Police Dept. v. Montgomery Twp. Bd. of Supervisors,
22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 653, 349 A.2d 917 (1976).
135. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 6, at 745-796.
136. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.7(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
137. Allegheny County Firefighters, Local 1038, v. Allegheny County, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct.
81, 299 A.2d 60 (1973).
138. Section 703 prohibits the parties to the collective bargaining agreement from implementing a provision in the agreement that is in violation of or in conflict with a statute. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
139. 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 639, 357 A.2d 721 (1976), af'dby an equally diidedcourt, 483 Pa.
604, 398 A.2d 168 (1978).
140. The maintenance of membership clause of the agreement was in conflict with § 1122
of the Public School Code of 1949, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (Purdon 1962).

law.""''

The court reasoned that "[tihe analogy to the instant case is

'1 4 2
obvious and the reasoning and rationale are persuasive here.'

Hence, the commonwealth court allows a narrow scope of re-

view of awards under PERA, upon considerations similar to the "illegality standard" applied to Act 111 arbitration awards. Under
both PERA and Act 111, the premise is that an arbitrator may only

require a party to do that which it could do voluntarily.1 43 This rule
is sound for PERA arbitrations because section 703 prohibits illegal

contract provisions.t44
2. Erroneous Interpretationof ExternalLaw-A broader view

of illegality under section I I(d) of the Arbitration Act is that an
award may be modified because of the arbitrator's erroneous interpretation of law external to the contract. Holding such an award to
be unenforceable is a natural extension of the affirmative illegal act

standard. Beaver County indicates that reversal for error of fact by
the arbitrator is not proper, 145 although modification for mistake of
law is proper under the Arbitration Act.
In City ofLebanon v. District Council89, American Federationof
State, County andMunicipal Employees,146 the arbitrator ruled that

he was not bound by the guilty verdict of a jury in a judicial proceeding related to the discipline challenged in arbitration. The commonwealth court reversed the arbitrator, holding that because the
verdict would have been conclusive in a later civil proceeding, 147 it
was equally conclusive on the arbitrator. 148 The court relied on the
illegality language of section 11(d) of the Arbitration Act and the
essence test in determining that4 9disregard of the verdict was a mistake of law requiring reversal.'
141. 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 642, 357 A.2d at 722.
142. id. at 646, 357 A.2d at 724.
143. Allegheny County Firefighters, Local 1038 v. Allegheny County, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct.
81, 86-87, 299 A.2d 60, 61-62 (1973).
144. See notes 150-51 and accompanying text infra.
145. See notes 87-96 and accompanying text supra.
146. 36 Pa. Commw. Ct. 442, 388 A.2d 1116 (1978).
147. See, e.g., Kravitz Estate, 418 Pa. 319, 211 A.2d 443 (1965).
148. 36 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 447, 388 A.2d at 1118.
149. Id But cf.Commonwealth v. Joint Bargaining Comm. of Pa. Employment Security
Employees Ass'n, 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 347, 386 A.2d 1050 (1978), in which the court upheld the
arbitrator's determination that a guilty plea to a summary offense was not the equivalent of
being convicted for a "crime or misdemeanor" within the meaning of the parties' agreement.
This decision may be distinguished, however, on the grounds that the award was based on a
construction of the terms of the agreement, rather than on the class of the offense. The court
noted that it is not clear whether a summary offense is a crime within the meaning of the
statute. Id. at 351 n.3, 386 A.2d at 1052 n.3. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Council 13,
AFSCME, 43 Pa. Commw. Ct. 177, 401 A.2d 1248 (1979), the commonwealth court affirmed
an arbitrator's award requiring the Commonwealth to make salary payments for a period during which no state budget existed. Since the award was based on the salary provisions of the
agreement, the court refused to set aside the award even though the Pennsylvania Constitution
prohibits salary payments without legislative authority. PA. CoNsT. art. 8, §§ 12, 13.

In holding that a mistake of law requires reversal of the arbitral
award, the court does not depart from either Beaver County or the
traditional scope of the essence test. Although grounding an award
in a principle of external law may be viewed asprimafacieevidence
that the arbitrator went beyond the four corners of the agreement, 150
the sounder rationale is that an arbitrator's award based on a principle of external law is fully reviewable on appeal.
First, arbitrators are not experts in the law.' 5 ' No basis exists
for affording an arbitrator's interpretation of law greater insulation
from review than is afforded a court's determination. That PERA
requires arbitration is no justification for courts abjuring their responsibility for being the final arbiters of the law and public policy.
An arbitrator's award based on an interpretation of law external to
the contract stands on the same footing as a determination of law by
a court and should be fully reviewable when appealed.
Second, foreclosure of review for erroneous interpretation of
law under PERA could result in the absurdity of enforcing a clearly
erroneous award. Since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refuses to
allow collateral attack on the validity of an arbitral award under
PERA, 5 2 the PLRB would be in the position of ordering enforcement of an award based on an error of law.'" 3 Clearly, such a result
cannot be tolerated. Policy considerations demand that arbitral
awards conform to proper construction of applicable statutes and
case law. A public employer bound by a nonreviewable award
based on a mistake of law is faced with the alternative of complying
with the erroneous award, or refusing to comply and being subject to
an unfair labor practice charge and subsequent enforcement. 54 Full
review of arbitral awards grounded in interpretations of external law
is warranted, not under the guise of the essence test, but rather, as a
review of a determination of law.

150. St. Antoine, supra note 4, at 1142.
151. One author has noted,
There is. . . no reason to credit arbitrators with any competence, let alone any special expertise, with respect to the law, as distinguished from the agreement. Many
arbitrators lack any legal training at all, and even lawyer-arbitrators do not necessarily hold themselves out as knowledgable about the broad range of statutory and administrative materials that may be relevant in labor arbitrations.
Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Relations, in THE ARBITRATOR, THE
NLRB, AND THE COURTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 16 (D. Jones ed. 1967). See also Meltzer, The Role ofLaw in
Arbitration.- Rejoinder, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS

58 (C. Rehmus ed. 1968).
152. PLRB v. Commonwealth, 478 Pa. 582, 387 A.2d 475 (1978).
153. The Board may not inquire into the merits of the award once an appeal has been
denied. Id See notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
154. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1201(a)(8) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).

V.

Conclusion

Nine years have passed since the enactment of the Public Employe Relations Act, but public sector labor law in Pennsylvania is
far from settled. Although a definite and expeditious procedure for
appealing an arbitrator's award evolved, no firm standard of judicial
review exists despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's pronouncements in Beaver County, Leechburg Area School District, and County
of Allegheny.
The need for an imaginative approach to public sector labor
law' 55 has not been met by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's creation of an ad hoc standard of review for PERA awards. The Commonwealth Court's attempts to rationalize the inconsistent
pronouncements of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, while laudable, appear to be only the application of the federal courts' essence
test under another name. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruled that federal labor law does not provide a "monolithic
model"' 5 6 for Pennsylvania's public sector labor law and because as
scholars note, the essence test presents too narrow of a standard, 57 it
is not the proper standard for Pennsylvania's public sector.
The future success of PERA's mandatory arbitration procedures
depends on the adoption of a definite standard of review. A desirable standard would respect the finality of arbitration with respect to
contract interpretation, while providing full review of interpretations
of law underlying the award. A broad interpretation of the Arbitration Act provisions accomplishes this. A restrictive application of
the essence test does not. Whatever weight the undermining of arbitral finality has when arbitration is a consensual product of collective
bargaining, its forcefulness is reduced in the context of the PERA's
compulsory arbitration provisions. Because the public interest is implicated by any decision affecting public employees, the courts, as
the final arbiters of the public interest and public policy, should
make the final determination of issues directly affecting that interest.
Whether an application of Beaver County ensures that result remains
to be seen.
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155. See Stein, Public Sector Bargainingin 1985, 28 LAB. L.J. 264 (1976).
156. PLRB v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 500, 337 A.2d 262, 265 (1975).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has held federal labor law principles applicable to questions under PERA in areas other than arbitration. Appeal of Cumberland Valley
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National Labor Relations Act contain similar provisions with respect to unfair labor practices,
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